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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
OBLIGATIONS -

POTESTATIVE CONDITIONS -

RIGHT TO

TERMINATE IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

Plaintiff sued his former employer on the ground that the
employer had discharged him in violation of their employment
contract. The contract was to be of five years' duration with the
plaintiff alone reserving the right of termination upon giving
two weeks' notice. After the employment had continued for two
and one-half years, the defendant discharged the plaintiff without apparent cause. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal
approved the district court's conclusion in sustaining the defendant's exception of no cause of action on the basis that the contract on its face was invalid and unenforceable as it contained a
potestative condition. On certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, held, reversed. A clause in an employment contract giving the employee the exclusive right to terminate merely upon
two weeks' notice is not a potestative condition which would result in nullity of the contract. Long v. Foster & Associates, 136
So. 2d 48 (La. 1961).
Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject of potestative conditions is a curious admixture of French law, cgmmon law, and
Louisiana's own unique conceptions. Articles 1170 and 1174 of
the French Civil Code deal with potestative conditions.1 The former defines as potestative a contractual condition the fulfillment
of which is within the power of one of the contracting parties to
bring about or hinder. The latter article provides that every
obligation contracted on a potestative condition on the part of
him who purports to bind himself is null. The French authorities
limit the effect of the latter article to obligations the existence
of which are subject to a purely potestative condition. A condition is purely potestative when its fulfillment depends on nothing
more than the exercise of the will of the obligor - that is, where,
because of the condition, no limitation is imposed on the obligor's
legal freedom. The existence of an obligation is dependent on a
purely potestative condition when the effect of the condition is
to prevent the assumption of that obligation until a further exergood faith and with a spirit of fair play in his relationship with his principal.
This disclosure might operate as a termination of the agency or lead to a revocation of the agency by the principal. This would necessitate an investigation as
to whether the relationship as present in the instant case would be a power
coupled with an interest such as to render the agency irrevocable. This question
was not raised here by the court.
1. These French code provisions correspond identically with LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 2024, 2034 (1870) :
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cise of the obligor's will. 2 For example, if A promises to sell his
house to B if A wishes, the obligation is a nullity since any obligation on A's part will not exist unless and until A thereafter
expresses his will to become bound to sell. On the other hand, if
the assumption of an obligation does not depend solely upon a
further exercise of the obligor's will, the obligation is not rendered null by Article 1174 even though the performance of it
may be suspended by some condition the fulfillment of which
rests with the obligor. Where A promises to sell his house to B
if A moves to Paris, A actually assumes an obligation to sell.
The fact that he cannot be obliged to fulfill it unless he moves to
Paris does not destroy its obligatory effect. Such a condition is
not purely potestative because it does not leave the promisor
with his complete legal freedom.3 Likewise the obligation would
be effective were A to promise to work for B for a certain period
of time subject to the condition that A could terminate this employment at any time within that period. Although the condition is purely potestative, it does not prevent the existence of the
obligation to work since it has only to do with the duration of an
obligation which arose when A promised to work. These articles
deal only with the effect of a potestative condition on the part of
him who binds himself. They make no reference to the obligee
because, under the French theory of the binding efficacy of the
will, a person can bind himself without receiving an obligation
4
in return if he possesses the requisite intent to be so bound.
"Art. 2024.

The potestative

condition is

that which

makes the execution

of the agreement depend on an event which it is in the power of the one or the
other of the contracting parties to bring about or to hinder."
"Art. 2034. Every obligation is null, that has been contracted, on a potestative
condition, on the part of him who binds himself."
2. 4 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 302 (6th ed. 1946) ; 2 BAUDRYLACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAITt THtoRIQuE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL nos

781-784 (3d ed. 1907) ; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1269A (1959) ; 3 TOULLIER,
LE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS nos 492-94 (1846). See, generally, Brown, Potestative
Conditions and Illusory Promises, 5 TUL. L. REV. 396 (1931) ; Smith, The Principle of Mutuality of Obligation and its Juridical Utility in Enforcing Contractual
Fair Dealing, FESTSCHRIFT FR ERNST RABEL, Band I, 279 (1954).

3. Though the moving or not moving may depend on A's will, A cannot move
to Paris without incurring the corresponding responsibility to sell to B. Hence
the condition imposes a limitation on his legal freedom. Conditional promises such
as one by A that he will sell if he raises his hand or wears a gray hat are similar
in form to a promise to sell if he moves. However, these are considered purely
potestative conditions, since the act itself is so trivial that in actuality the obligation rests solely on the obligor's will.
4. 17 LAURENT, PRINCIPES n 64 (2d ed. 1876). Cf. DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE
GENERALE, OBLIGATIONS no 1148 (1860). See Brown, Potestative Conditions and
Illusory Promises, 5 TUL. L. REV. 396 (1931); Smith, A Refresher Course in
Cause, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 2

(1951).
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Thus these articles merely recognize that, if a party purporting
to obligate himself employs language that does not constitute the
assumption of an obligation, it follows that his obligation is null.
In effect, the code provisions merely spell out the truism that he
who has not obligated himself has no obligation.
At common law, a valid bilateral contract cannot be formed
unless each party has given consideration for the promise of the
other. In order to constitute consideration, a promise must not
be wholly illusory. ' A wholly illusory promise is one subject to
a condition which imposes no limitation on one's legal freedom
regardless of whether it goes to the existence or the duration of
an obligation. However if the condition does impose some limitation on the legal freedom of the promisor, it ceases to be wholly
illusory and the imposition acts as legal support for the promise
of the other party. At common law the promise of the employee
to render services subject to a power of cancellation on a period
of notice is generally considered sufficient consideration for a
return promise by the employer which guarantees the opportunity of employment for a definite period of time. The promise
to work for at least the period of notice constitutes a restraint
on the legal freedom of the promisor.
Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2024 and 2034 are identical
with French Civil Code Articles 1170 and 1174 discussed above.
In addition to these, the Louisiana Civil Code contains Articles
7
2035 and 2036 which have no counterpart in the French Code.
Generally they present the premise that the performance or the
duration of an obligation may depend on the will of a party without affecting the validity of the obligation. It seems, therefore,
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1933).
6. Newhall v. Journal Printing Co., 105 Minn. 44, 46, 117 N.W. 228 (1908)
"It is, however, well settled that a contract for employment is not lacking in
mutuality because the party employed does not bind himself to continue in the
employment for a definite period." See Stern & Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 148 Conn. 527, 172 A.2d 614 (1961); 1. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 163-164
(1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 141 (1936).
7. The provisions of these articles appeared first in the Civil Code of 1825.
They state:
"The last preceding article is limited to potestative conditions, which make
the obligation depend solely on the exercise of the obligor's will; but if the condition be, that the obligor shall do or not do a certain act, although the doing or
not doing of the act depends on the will of the obligor, yet the obligation depending on such condition, is not void."

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2035 (1870).

"An obligation may also be made, by consent of the parties, to depend on the
will of the obligee for its duration. Thus a lease may be made during the will
of the lessor, and a sale may be made conditioned to be void, if the vendor chooses
to redeem the property sold." Id. art. 2036.
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that the code articles reflect the French principle that it is only

the purely potestative condition which prevents the assumption
of any obligation that is considered as imparting nullity. By way
of example, it is expressly provided that a perfectly valid lease

will be formed although a power of termination is reserved to
the lessor. Unlike the French, the Louisiana courts have avoided
holding definitively that a person may bind himself by his will
alone." In consequence, if the obligation of one party is subject
to a nullifying potestative condition, the obligation of the other
party to a bilateral contract is also null.9
Blanchard v. Haber10 was the first Louisiana Supreme Court
decision holding an employment contract invalid because it was
subject to a potestative condition." Both the employee and the
employer had reserved the right to terminate the employment
after thirty days' notice. In addition, the contract contained the
provision that, in the event it was cancelled, the employee, a
dentist, could not compete within a certain area of the city for
ten years. The court held the contract null on two grounds.
8. Landeche v. Sarpy, 37 La. Ann. 835 (1885).
9. Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 1031, 42 So. 489, 491 (1906): "We
conclude that the contract, since it accorded to the lessee the right to put an end
to it at any time, was purely potestative on the part of the lessee, and therefore
null. Civ. Code, Art. 2034."
10. 166 La. 1014, 118 So. 117 (1928).
11. Certain mineral lease cases provided the first opportunity for the Louisiana
courts to apply the code provisions dealing with potestative conditions to contracts
involving the right to terminate an obligation. Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La.
1023, 42 So. 489 (1906); Goodson v. Vivian Oil Co., 129 La. 955, 57 So. 281
(1912) ; Berl v. Kehoe, 130 La. 1020, 58 So. 864 (1912) ; Long v. Sun Co., 132
La. 601, 61 So. 684 (1913). These were generally mineral leases in which the
lessee promised to drill within a certain period of time, but reserved the right
to terminate this drilling obligation by paying some nominal sum. Out of these
cases evolved the doctrine that if the driller does not give "serious" consideration
for his right to terminate, the contract contains a potestative condition which
renders it null. There is serious consideration only when the amount paid for
the lease with the right to terminate is found not to be all out of proportion to
the value of the lease. In reference to the effect of potestative conditions, the
doctrine of serious consideration seems to be a unique conception of Louisiana
law. The power of cancellation, under French theory, would affect only the
duration of an existing obligation. At common law the payment of even a nominal
sum is generally considered sufficient consideration. However, these decisions are
equitable in that the lessor, in signing a mineral lease prepared by the lessee,
was obviously laboring under the misconception that the lessee was obliged to drill
a well upon his land when in fact the lessee could avoid this obligation entirely
by making a nominal payment. Perhaps the doctrine of serious consideration
merely reflects the court's adherence to the principle that, where there appears
to be lacking a serious and true will to bind oneself, an obligation should not be
formed. Applied to the mineral lease cases, this would mean that since the
object of the contract from the standpoint of the lessor was to have a well drilled
on his land, it could not be said that he had a serious and true will to bind
himself in return for a promise subject to a condition which defeated the very
purpose of his obligation.
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First, the court treated the agreement to pay wages as consideration solely for the agreement to render services and thus concluded that the non-competition obligation was completely unsupported by consideration. Secondly, the court found that the obligations imposed on the employee were contracted under a potestative condition - that there was no "serious" consideration for
his promises. Until the decision in Martin-Parryv. New Orleans
Fire Detection Service,12 twenty-four years later, the Blanchard
case was not directly challenged. 13 Under facts similar to those
4
of Blanchard,the court in Martin-Parryupheld the contract.' It
was said that the court in Blanchard had been in error when it
divided the contract into parts, and then required reciprocal
obligations to support each promise. It concluded that the promises of one party act as the inducement for the promises of the
other, and that a consideration must be found only in his total
obligation and not in each separate promise. Then, relying heavily on the mutuality of the right to terminate, the court found
that such a contract was not subject to a nullifying potestative
condition.
The instant case involved the first employment contract before the Louisiana courts wherein the right of termination was
reserved exclusively in one party. The court of appeal concluded
that, since the right was not mutually accorded, the condition
was potestative, and thus the contract was null. 5 The Supreme
Court reversed on two grounds. First, Article 2035 was found
to limit potestative conditions which produce nullity to those
which are purely potestative. The court defined a purely potestative condition as:
"[0] ne which is subject only to the whim or pleasure of the
promisor and would involve no detriment, disadvantage or
inconvenience to him if he brings about or hinders the happening of the event on which the obligation depends."' 6
The period of notice and the loss of certainty of employment
12. 221 La. 677, 60 So.2d 83 (1952).
13. See Cloverland Dairy Products Co. v. Grace, 180 La. 694, 157 So. 393
(1934) ; Shreveport Laundries v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
But see Cali v. National Linen Service Corp., 38 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1930), which
found "serious" consideration in a similar agreement.
14. The non-competition clause in the contract in Martin-Parrywas an agreement by employee not to disturb, hire, or entice away any other employee of the
company for two years after termination of the contract. See note 18 infra.
15. Long v. Foster & Associates, 129 So.2d 601 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
16. Long v. Foster & Associates, 136 So.2d 48, 53 (La. 1961). See also Humble
Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory, 212 La. 646, 33 So.2d 182 (1946).
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were indicated as definite detriments which the employee would
suffer in the exercise of his power of termination. Thus the
condition was not purely potestative. Secondly, the court concluded that the contract could have been upheld on the basis of
Article 2036 alone. Since employment is considered a lease of
labor, 17 an agreement allowing the lessor the right to determine
the duration of the lease is expressly valid under this article.
The court stated:
"But conceding for the sake of argument that the assailed
cancellation clause was purely potestative in nature, nevertheless it related solely to the duration of the contract; and
Revised Civil Code Article 2036 specifically recognizes the
validity of an agreement when the duration thereof is left to
the will of one of the parties." (Emphasis added.) 18
The court of appeal referred to potestative conditions as a
"vague and uncertain twilight zone of our jurisprudence."' 9 It
seems that the decision in the instant case may have shed some
illumination on this darkness. The court emphasized that the
nullity under Article 2034 is limited in application to purely
potestative conditions. Moreover the court recognized a further
important and often neglected limitation on this article when
it is construed in the light of Article 2036. This is, that Article
2034 does not render null those obligations where only the duration thereof is left to the will of one of the parties. Hence the
court, at least in agreements similar to a lease, seems to adopt
the French interpretation that it is only the purely potestative
condition which prevents the existence of an obligation that
imparts nullity under this code provision. 20 The result in the
17. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2669, 2673 (1870).
18. Long v. Foster & Associates, 136 So.2d 48, 53 (La. 1961). See also
Conques v. Andrus, 162 La. 73, 110 So. 93 (1926) (enforcement of a re-purchase
clause). The court also emphasized the error in searching for reciprocal considerations for each stipulation in an agreement. The principal consideration in
an employment contract is the exchange of services for wages, and thus all other
provisions are merely "incidental" stipulations which are included to form the
inducement for making the contract. Such incidental stipulations depend solely
on the will of the parties; they need not be mutually accorded; and they must be
given effect when not repugnant to law or public policy. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 1764 (1870) ("accidental stipulations"). The reasoning of the Blanchard
case was expressly overruled. However, the court indicated that the result reached
in that case was correct because that kind of non-competition clause was against
public policy.. It was expressly declared so in La. Acts 1934, No. 133. The type
of restraint imposed by the contract under consideration in the Martin-Parry
case was not contrary to this act.
19. Long v. Foster & Associates, 129 So.2d 601, 602 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
20. The mineral lease cases of the type discussed in note 11 supra, where
the right of termination was held to invalidate the contract were distinguished
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instant case is clearly consistent with both French and common
law principles and appears to be a commendable addition to the
Louisiana jurisprudence.
William Shelby McKenzie

THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE, LIS PENDENS, AND CIVIL
CODE ARTICLE 150
Plaintiff filed suit for separation from bed and board against
her husband and obtained a preliminary injunction prohibiting
him from alienating community property. Neither the suit nor
the injunction was recorded in the mortgage or conveyance records of the parish where the community immovables were
located. Over a year later, the husband sold a lot belonging to the
community to a third person who had no actual knowledge of
the pending suit or of the injunction. Plaintiff sued to annul
the sale. The trial court dismissed on the ground that the public
records doctrine protected the third party purchaser. On appeal
to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, held, affirmed. A wife
cannot annul a sale of community property by the husband to one
who purchased in good faith, where notices of a pending action
for separation from bed and board and an injunction against
alienation of community property were not recorded in the
mortgage or conveyance records. Shapiro v. Bryan, 132 So.2d
97 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
Article 22661 of the Civil Code provides that unrecorded sales,
contracts and judgments shall be utterly null and void with respect to third party transferees. The Louisiana Supreme Court in
by the court in the instant case as cases where "the court concluded that there
had been no suitable consideration given or obligation incurred by the lessee for
the right to 'tie up' the lessor's property for the term of the lease." Long v.
Foster & Associates, 136 So.2d 48, 54 (La. 1961). When the holding in the instant
case is viewed in the light of the mineral lease cases, it appears that the court
may require, in enforcing a contract containing a conditional promise, some assurance that a party appreciated the fact that he was binding himself in return for
a conditional promise and seriously intended to be so bound. In the instant case
the facts afford no basis for believing that there was anything but a serious and
true intent on the part of the employer to bind himself as he did. The employer
was at least in an equal bargaining position with the employee. If the termination
clause were exercised, it also ended the obligations of the employer with respect
to the employee. It seems evident that the power of cancellation was simply an
inducement for the employee to undertake the employment.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266 (1870): "All sales, contracts and judgments
affecting immovable property, which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null
and void, except between the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any
time, but shall only affect third persons from the time of the recording."

